Refined text by fixing typos and improving clarity (#1186)

* Update CHANGELOG.md

* Update README.md

Author: davidjsonn

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -62,6 +62,6 @@ Ref: https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/
 - [\#806](https://github.com/cosmos/ibc/pull/806) Adds previous version to UpgradeInit and UpgradeTry callback arguments
 - [\#807](https://github.com/cosmos/ibc/pull/807) Upgrade keys will now prefix the channel path to align with the rest of ICS4 keys
 - [\#842](https://github.com/cosmos/ibc/pull/842) Adds metadata field to FungibleTokenPacketData
-- [\#844](https://github.com/cosmos/ibc/pull/844) Adds event emission in `recvPacket` when `packet.sequence < nextSequenceRecv` for ordered channels and when `packetRecepit != null` for unordered channels
+- [\#844](https://github.com/cosmos/ibc/pull/844) Adds event emission in `recvPacket` when `packet.sequence < nextSequenceRecv` for ordered channels and when `packetReceipt != null` for unordered channels
 - [\#845](https://github.com/cosmos/ibc/pull/845) Adds explanation about `onRecvPacket` callback returning an error in interchain accounts controller modules
 - [\#886](https://github.com/cosmos/ibc/pull/886) Makes `icacontroller-` prefix optional in ICA controller port identifier

spec/eureka/README.md

@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ Properties of Channel:
 
 In core IBC, the connection and channel handshakes serve to ensure the validity of counterparty clients, ensure the IBC and application versions are mutually compatible, as well as providing unique identifiers for each side to refer to the counterparty.
 
-Since we are removing handshakes in IBC lite, we must have a different way to provide the chain with knowledge of the counterparty. With a client, we can prove any key/value path on the counterparty. However, without knowing which identifier the counterparty uses when it sends messages to us; we cannot differentiate between messages sent from the counterparty to our chain vs messages sent from the counterparty with other chains. Most implementations will not be able to store the ICS-24 paths directly as a key in the global namespace; but will instead write to a reserved, prefixed keyspace so as not to conflict with other application state writes. Thus the counteparty information we must have includes both its identifier for our chain as well as the key prefix under which it will write the provable ICS-24 paths.
+Since we are removing handshakes in IBC lite, we must have a different way to provide the chain with knowledge of the counterparty. With a client, we can prove any key/value path on the counterparty. However, without knowing which identifier the counterparty uses when it sends messages to us; we cannot differentiate between messages sent from the counterparty to our chain vs messages sent from the counterparty with other chains. Most implementations will not be able to store the ICS-24 paths directly as a key in the global namespace; but will instead write to a reserved, prefixed keyspace so as not to conflict with other application state writes. Thus the counterparty information we must have includes both its identifier for our chain as well as the key prefix under which it will write the provable ICS-24 paths.
 
 Thus, IBC lite will introduce a new message `ProvideCounterparty` that will associate the counterparty client of our chain with our client of the counterparty. Thus, if the `ProvideCounterparty` message is submitted to both sides correctly. Then both sides have mirrored <client,client> pairs that can be treated as channel identifiers. Assuming they are correct, the client on each side is unique and provides an authenticated stream of packet data between the two chains. If the `ProvideCounterparty` message submits the wrong clientID, this can lead to invalid behaviour; but this is equivalent to a relayer submitting an invalid client in place of a correct client for the desired chain. In the simplest case, we can rely on out-of-band social consensus to only send on valid <client, client> pairs that represent a connection between the desired chains of the user; just as we currently rely on out-of-band social consensus that a given clientID and channel built on top of it is the valid, canonical identifier of our desired chain.
 
@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ function timeoutPacket(
     assert(err != nil)
 
     // check that timeout height or timeout timestamp has passed on the other end
-    asert(
+    assert(
       (packet.timeoutHeight > 0 && proofHeight >= packet.timeoutHeight) ||
       (packet.timeoutTimestamp > 0 && proofTimestamp >= packet.timeoutTimestamp))